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Abstract 
 
Reputation systems are ubiquitously employed in the online marketplaces to provide information 
on users’ abilities and trustworthiness. We focus particularly on the problem of reputation 
stretching, the extension of an established reputation into a new market. By examining various 
factors—market size, the expected performance in the expanding market, and the risk of 
performance in the expanding market—we characterize conditions that affect bidder’s stretching 
decision in the expanding market. Moreover, we analyze both the short-term and the long-term 
expanding cases, and obtain contrasting results in the two settings. 
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1. Introduction 
Reputation unarguably plays a major role in settings that involve interactions and exchange. 
Although in the business world reputation is often reflected in the company’s brand name, it is 
essentially the evaluation of one’s past performance in most online settings. As the Internet 
opens up a vast market for e-businesses and trading individuals, the myriad of choices as well as 
the intrinsic anonymity lead to an increased importance of reputation. While the study of 
reputation can take a broad range of perspectives, we focus on reputation stretching--the 
extension of one’s existing reputation relating to a product onto a different product--by 
examining various factors that affect a user’s decision of reputation stretching.  
 
Applying the reputation stretching concept on online traders, it is evident that the eBay 
reputation system fully permits reputation stretching by assigning only one reputation metric for 
each user. For instance, a seller who sells laptops as well as clothing under the same identity is 
implicitly using reputation stretching between two types of products. On the other hand, sellers 
can potentially register separate identities for selling different products; thus the question of 
multiple identities arises. Despite eBay’s effort to verify user identity in order to prevent the 
ownership of multiple accounts by one user, it is not difficult for users to open new accounts, 
hence start a new reputation from a clean slate. eBay’s reputation system is representative of 
many other online marketplaces, such as Amazon.com, where reputation stretching is clearly a 
strategy that sellers can effectively employ to their advantages. 
 
Another example of reputation stretching resides in the ranking system used by Google Adwords 
program for keyword advertising. Keyword advertising is an online marketing service, where 
advertisers specify keywords under which they want their advertisements to appear (Liu and 
Chen 2005). While advertisers bid on how much they are willing to pay for every click, Google 
ranks advertisers basing on their unit-price bids as well as their past performances. In particular, 
past performance is measured by the historical click-through rate (CTR), the ratio of the number 
of clicks an advertisement receives to the number of times it is displayed. Such past 
performances roughly represent bidders’ reputations, which are incorporated into the auction 
ranking system, and hence directly impact bidders’ payoffs. The system appears to be designed 
so that an advertiser has separate reputation measures for different advertisements. However, the 
advertisers have the ability to easily tweak their account settings to exercise reputation stretching 
between advertisements. By understanding the elements influencing bidders’ reputation 
stretching decisions, we can shed light on optimal designs for reputation systems.  
 
In this paper, we use an auction setting, motivated by the Google keyword auction ranking 
system, to model the impact of reputations on bidders’ payoffs. One advertiser faces the 
stretching decision from an existing market to an expanding market: the advertiser has reputation 
in the existing market, and makes the decision of whether to stretch this reputation onto the 
expanding market. We examine the effects of three important factors—market size, the expected 
performance in the expanding market, and the risk of performance in the expanding market—on 
advertisers’ stretching decisions in both short-term expanding and long-term expanding cases. 
 
Our short-term analysis considers a two-period model, where the advertiser makes the stretching 
decision in the first period for the expanding market, and then participates in the existing market 
in the second period. We find that the advertiser with good reputation stretches if the expanding 
market is significantly bigger than the existing market. Also, the advertiser with good reputation 
is more likely to stretch if the performance of the expanding market looks sufficiently promising, 
expecting a positive impact on the existing market. In addition, the performance risk in the 
expanding market also plays an important role: in a very competitive existing market, the higher 
the risk, the more likely one will stretch. We also investigate the long-term case, where the 
expanding market auction and the existing market auction take place alternately in the infinite 
horizon. Some results are notably different from those in the short-term analysis. When the gap 
between performances in two markets is big, it is optimal for the advertiser not to stretch. The 
effect of risk in performance depends on the market sizes. In general, the bidders tend to apply 
the risk effect to the big market. 
 
In section 2, we briefly review the related literature and compare our model with work that is 
similar to our study. We specify our model in section 3, and then examine the short-term 
expanding and the long-term expanding cases in section 4 and section 5, respectively. Finally, 
we conclude. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Early economic literature examined the role of reputation in establishing trust in the moral 
hazard and the adverse selection context. In the moral hazard setting, it has been showed that 
reputation can be employed to alleviate the agents’ incentive issue (e. g., Klein and Leffler 1981) 
Milgrom and Roberts (1982), Kreps and Wilson (1982), and Wernerfelt (1988) analyzed the 
problem using the adverse selection game model, where a player’s type is private information, 
and the other player forms and updates his/her beliefs about the opponent through repeated 
interactions. Reputation on and across different products was not studied until the recent years. 
 
Later research work extended the previous study to reputation stretching. Pepall and Richards 
(2002) examined the firm entry question in reputation stretch--when a firm stretches its current 
reputation on to a different market, it competes with the incumbents in that market or other firms 
that are taking the same strategy. Cabral (2000) considered reputation stretching in an adverse 
selection setting using the seller-buyer game model, where the seller makes the decision between 
stretching and not stretching his/her reputation of the base product onto a new product. The 
results are consistent with the intuition behind the direct reputation effect and the reputation 
feedback effect introduced—sellers of higher quality derive higher marginal benefit from 
stretching; and sellers’ stretching behavior depend on the importance of the new market relative 
to the base product market. 
 
Our study is most closely related to Cabral’s paper (2000), however, we introduce a completely 
different setting. Instead of using the seller-buyer game as in Cabral (2000) and many other 
related studies, we examine reputation stretching in a setting similar to keyword auctions, where 
multiple bidders compete. Reputation of one player, in our case, is not the information that 
another uses to assess this player, it is now part of the score that determines the winner of the 
final prize. In other words, instead of a mechanism for establishing trust with another player in a 
simple game, reputation is now a bidder’s attribute that plays a major part in the auction. In our 
study, different factors, such as market size, expected performance and the risk of performance 
in the expanding market, are examined and found to produce insightful results. Moreover, we 
start our analysis from a short-term model and then extend it to a long-term model to gain 
in-depth understanding of the effects of reputation on the total payoff in the infinitely repeated 
periods. 
 
3. Model 
We consider a two-market multi-period model where one advertiser, specifically indicated by , 
faces the decision of whether to stretch reputation from one market to the other. Advertisers 
differ in two dimensions ( v , ): valuation-per-click or unit-valuation, , and the click-through 
rate (CTR) or yield rate, . Let , which is the total valuation. Valuation per click can be 
understood as the average revenue the advertiser derives from each click received on its 
advertisement; the yield rate is essentially the probability the advertisement is clicked during 
each display. The yield rates, ’s, are modeled as indicators of advertisers’ performances in a 
market, which impact their payoffs in the current period and serve as their reputation for the next 
period. We apply one of the common assumptions in auction theories, Independent Private Value 
(IPV) assumption, that one’s total valuation is her/his private information, and is independent of 
others’ valuations.  
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In the market where advertiser  has an existing reputation (we will refer to this market as the 
existing market for brevity), the amount of traffic or the market size is , normalized into 1 
( ).  advertisers compete in the existing market, and their total valuations satisfy 
distribution .  can be derived from the joint distribution of ( , ). We assume the 
advertiser has a unit valuation , and stabilized performance  that does not vary from period 
to period. Thus, advertiser i  would have a fixed reputation  if he runs business in the 
existing market only. 
i
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In the other market where advertiser  has no prior reputation (we will refer to this market as the 
expanding market for brevity), the amount of traffic is . In the expanding market,  
advertisers compete, and their total valuations satisfy distribution . We assume the 
advertiser has the same unit valuation  as in the existing market, which simply is, and can be 
shown rigorously as, a normalization, since we allow different market sizes and valuation 
distributions in two markets. In other words, a model using a different  for the expanding 
market is equivalent to incorporating the difference into  and , leaving  the same as 
that in the existing market. The advertiser may have a high or low performance in this market. 
The expected performance in each period is , having outcomes 
i
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probability. ε  indicates the risk of the performance in the expanding market, and is relatively 
small such that ε−2q  is bounded away from 0. New entrants without past reputation records 
are assigned reputation . Since advertiser i  has no reputation in this market,  will be 
assigned if it chooses not to stretch. In the case of stretching, the advertiser undertakes the 
reputation, the performance in the last period, from the existing market. 
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In brief, the existing market is constructed to characterize a setting where the advertiser has 
established itself and possesses an existing reputation. Most uncertainties reside in the expanding 
market, where the advertiser has no prior participation, thus decides whether to stretch its prior 
reputation from the existing market according to factors that will be analyzed later in this section. 
 
We use auction to model the competitive environment, motivated by Google keyword auctions. 
We assume that the auctioneer allocates traffic through a unit-price auction. Every advertiser 
places its bid on how much it is willing to pay for each click, and ranking of the advertisers is 
based on their “scores.” Each score is the product of the advertiser’s bid and its reputation, which 
can be either performance in the previous period or the assigned reputation for the new entrant. 
The bidder with the highest score wins the auction, but only pays the unit price high enough to 
produce the second highest score when calculated with the winner’s reputation. Such 
second-price-like auction model, through its allocation rule, captures the impact that the 
reputation has on one’s current competitiveness. 
 
Advertisers are risk neutral, and their objective in each auction is to maximize their expected 
payoffs. We denote  as the advertiser’s unit-price bid in a market, and  as its reputation, 
which, as mentioned earlier, is either its last-period performance or the assigned reputation  in 
the case of a new entrant.  and  determine its winning probability in this market, denoted as 
. Also denote 
b qˆ
0q
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ˆPr( , )b q p  as the actual unit-price the advertiser pays if it wins. So, conditional on 
winning, its unit surplus is . Then the expected payoff can be written as (v p− )
 )ˆ,Pr())(()ˆ,,( qbpvqKEqbvu −=  (1) 
where , , is the market size, and  is the expected performance in this 
market. 
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The sequence of actions is as follows. Advertiser  first decides whether to stretch into the 
expanding market, then competes in the expanding market with the corresponding reputation 
i
based on its stretching decision; next, it competes in the existing market using the reputation 
depending on its stretching decision. The realization of  in one period determines the 
advertiser's payoff in that period; and, if stretching has been chosen,  becomes  for the next 
period thus affects the advertiser's winning probability in that period. For the above sequence of 
actions, we discuss both the short-term and long-term expanding cases. In the short-term 
expanding (two-period) model, the advertiser only runs the business in the expanding market for 
one period, which is modeled as a one shot game. In the long-term expanding (infinite repeated) 
model, the advertiser runs its business in both markets alternately and infinitely. 
q
q qˆ
 
We focus on the impact of three factors on the stretching decision: market size, advertiser's 
expected performance, and the risk of the performance in the expanding market. 
 
To begin the analysis, we derive advertisers' equilibrium bidding strategies and their equilibrium 
payoff in any single auction. 
 
Lemma 1: In each auction, bidding the true unit-valuation is the (weakly) dominant strategy. 
Proof: First, it is never optimal for a bidder to bid higher than his/her true unit-valuation. If one 
can win by bidding the true unit valuation, then there is nothing to gain by bidding higher. 
Otherwise, winning would necessarily result in a negative payoff, since the bidder would have to 
pay a price above his valuation. Second, for bidder j  with unit-valuation , bidding less than 
 is weakly dominated by bidding . Let  denote the highest score among the remaining 
bidders. If 
v
v v js−
j  can win with , it does so as well with vb < vb =  and without paying more (since 
by the second-score rule, j  pays for his/her yield at the unit price ). If jj qs ˆ/− j  does not win 
with , it will get zero payoff. It can get the same amount by bidding his/her true unit-valuation. 
Thus bidding one's true valuation is the weakly dominant strategy. Q.E.D. 
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Upon this truth bidding equilibrium, we obtain the equilibrium winning probability of an 
advertiser with unit valuation v  and reputation  in each auction: . For 
notational simplicity, we denote 
qˆ 1)]ˆ([)ˆ,Pr( −= nvqGqv
1( ) [ ( )] lnl lH s G s
−≡ , }2,1{∈l , which is the cumulative 
distribution function of the highest total valuation of 1−ln  bidders in market . Roughly, 
 embodies the competition in a market. Notice that 
l
)(sHl ]1,0[)( ∈sHl , and increases in s . 
 
Also, the price an advertiser pays, conditional on its winning, is the expected second-highest 
total valuation divided by its reputation: 
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where  is the random variable of the highest total valuation among  draws from 
distribution . 
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Substituting the above equilibrium winning probability and price in the payoff function (1), we 
can write the equilibrium payoff as 
 ∫∫ == vvq dttqHqKEdttHqqEKqvU 0
ˆ
0
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where the second step is a result of integration by substitution. 
 
4. Short-term Expanding: Two-period Model 
In this section, we focus on the case where the advertiser runs short-term business in the 
expanding market. Examples of the short-term expanding include advertising related to special 
events (e.g., FIFA World Cup and Olympics), seasonal promotions (e.g., Christmas promotion), 
etc., where the advertiser does not stay in the expanding market after the temporary activity. This 
contrasts with the long-term case discussed in the following section, where the expanding market 
is a new business that the advertiser is starting and will continually manage. 
 
We model bidding in this short-term expanding market as a one-shot game. In the first period, 
the advertiser competes in the auction for the expanding market either under a separate name 
(non-stretching with the assigned reputation ) or under the same name as that in the existing 
market (stretching with reputation ). In the second period, the advertiser competes in the 
auction for the existing market again, using reputation  in the non-stretching case or the 
performance in the expanding market as reputation in the stretching case. 
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If advertiser  chooses not to stretch, then it is assigned  as the initial reputation for the 
expanding market. Therefore, its expected payoff in the expanding market is 
 by (2), and, in the existing market, . 
The total expected payoff in both markets is 
i 0q
∫= ivi dttqHqKqvU 0 022202 )(),( ∫= ivi dttqHqqvU 0 11111 )(),(
),(),( 0211 qvUqvU ii + . 
 
If advertiser  chooses to stretch, its expected payoff in the expanding market, using reputation 
from the existing market, is . The realized reputation in the 
expanding market is 
i
∫= ivi dttqHqKqvU 0 122212 )(),(
ε+2q  or ε−2q  (with equal probability), which serves as the reputation 
for the existing market in the next period and affects its payoff for the current expanding market. 
We will refer to the former as the feedback effect. Clearly, different realized reputations result in 
different payoffs: 1 2( , )iU v q ε+  or 1 2( , )iU v q ε− . Notice that at the time the advertiser makes 
the stretching decision, it only has an expectation about the future payoff that depends on the 
uncertain performance, but does not know the actual realization. The expected payoff in the 
existing market is ∫∫ −++= ii vvi dttqHqdttqHqqvUE 0 2110 2111 ))((21))((21)],([ εε . The total 
expected payoff in both markets for the stretching case is ),()],([ 121 qvUqvUE ii + . 
 
The equilibrium stretching behavior can be determined by comparing the payoffs under 
stretching and non-stretching cases. The difference in payoffs, [ ] )],(),([),()],([ 0211121 qvUqvUqvUqvUE iiii +−+≡Δ , is 
 [ ] +−=Δ ∫ iv dttqHtqHqK 0 021222 )()( [ ]∫ −−++iv dttqHtqHtqHq 0 1121211 )(2))(())((21 εε  (3) 
Thus, if , it is optimal for an advertiser to stretch; otherwise, it is optimal not to stretch. 0>Δ
 
Clearly, the relative market size will impact the stretching decision. We conclude the following: 
 
Proposition 1: Given  , and 0q , 2q ε , when the expanding market is large enough ( ), if 
, it is optimal for the advertiser to stretch; if 
*
2 KK ≥
01 qq > 01 qq < , it is optimal not to stretch. 
Proof: From (3), if ,  increases in . If 01 qq > )( 2KΔ 2K 0)0( ≥Δ , it is optimal for the advertiser 
to stretch and . If , there exists 0* =K 0)0( <Δ *K  such that . So, for , 
. Thus it is optimal for the advertiser to stretch. Similar analysis holds for the case 
with . Q.E.D. 
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When the expanding market is of considerable size relative to the existing market, the payoff in 
the expanding market dominates that in the existing market. Thus, for a good-reputation 
advertiser, the gain from stretching in the expanding market by getting competitive advantage 
can out-weigh any possible loss from the negative feedback effect on the existing market; for a 
bad-reputation advertiser, the loss from stretching is too big to be compensated from the possible 
gain from existing market. 
 
It is worth noting that when the expending market is small, it is not clear whether advertisers 
with good reputation will stretch or not. In fact, in the case with small enough expanding market, 
the advertiser's stretching decision depends on the feedback effect on the existing market: if 
, the advertiser will stretch expecting that the good reputation in the expanding market 
will enhance the competitiveness in the existing market; if 
12 qq >>
12 qq << , the advertiser will not 
stretch expecting that the bad reputation in the expanding market will dampen the 
competitiveness in the existing market. 
 
Proposition 2: Given , 0q ε , and , for a high reputation advertiser ( ), there exists 
such that for any  it is optimal for the advertiser to stretch; and the gain from stretching 
is increasing in . For a low reputation advertiser (
2K 01 qq > *2q  
*
22 qq ≥
2q 01 qq < ), increase in  has no conclusive 
effect. 
2q
Proof: From (3), if , it is easy to verify that 01 qq > )( 2qΔ  increases in ; and there must exist 
 such that, for , . As a result, for any , it is optimal for the advertiser 
to stretch. Due to the monotonicity of 
2q
*
2q
*
22 qq ≥ 0)( 2 ≥Δ q *22 qq ≥
)( 2qΔ , the bigger , the more gain from stretching. For 
the case with , increase in  has negative impact on the expanding market but positive 
impact on the existing market; so there is no conclusive effect. Q.E.D. 
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When the advertiser’s reputation is higher than the default reputation, stretching is clearly 
advantageous for winning in the expanding market. Also, when the expected performance is high 
enough, the expanding market is optimistic. Therefore by stretching, the high-reputation 
advertiser can potentially further improve the reputation significantly, which benefits its existing 
market payoff.  
 
However, for an advertiser, whose reputation is lower than the default reputation, its stretching 
decision depends on the tradeoff between the loss of expected payoff in the expanding market 
and possible gain from the reputation feedback effect on the existing market. When the expected 
performance increases, both the loss and gain increase, so the net effect is inconclusive. It is 
possible that under some circumstances, a low reputation advertiser also has incentive to stretch, 
just like in the case of the good reputation advertiser, when the feedback effect dominates the 
direct effect. 
 
Lastly, we find that the risk of the performance in the expanding market also impacts the 
stretching decision. 
Proposition 3: If  is convex, the gain from stretching is increasing in the risk in the 
expanding market. If  is concave, the opposite holds. 
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Proof: Notice that . In the case with convex 
,  since  increases in 
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So 0)(' >Δ ε  and thus Δ  increases in ε . In the case with concave ,  decreases in )(1 sH Δ ε . 
Q.E.D. 
 
Recall that  is the distribution of the highest total valuation of one’s 
competitors, and  is the distribution of total valuation in the existing market. Convexity of 
 means that the competitors’ highest valuation is more likely to appear toward high 
valuation end, which can be easily satisfied. It can be shown that non-decreasing density function 
 suffices to guarantee  to be convex. Also, for most continuous distributions, 
when  is reasonably big,  commonly emerges as convex. Both cases can be 
interpreted as that the market is competitive enough: the former emphasizes the bidders’ values 
are skewed toward the high-end; and the latter simply means enough bidders compete in the 
market. 
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As indicated above, when the existing market is competitive, an increase in the risk of the 
expanding market performance may benefit the advertiser in the case of stretching. Here 
increasing the risk has two effects: making the good realization better and making the bad 
realization worse. Given that the competitor is more skewed toward high valuation, the impact 
from being better is more significant than that from being worse. 
 
By the results derived in this section, when an advertiser is considering stretching its reputation 
to a market short term—for example, selling Olympic coin sets—it can base the decision on its 
current reputation and the three factors discussed above. First, if the expanding market is large 
(e.g., there is an enormous demand for Olympic coins sets since it is a global event), then 
high-reputation advertiser should stretch to take advantage of the established reputation. Second, 
if the expected performance in the expanding market is high, stretching is optimal for 
high-reputation. Third, in the stretching case, the risk of the performance in the expanding 
market may have different implications for the advertiser depending on the competition 
environment of the existing market. Facing a fierce competition in the existing market, the 
advertiser may appreciate the risk of the expanding market, expecting that possible high 
performance could bring in a significant revenue increase via the feedback effect.  
 
5. Long-term Expanding: Infinite-period Model 
In this section, the expanding market is not short-lived like in the previous section; rather, it 
repeats and alternates with the existing market infinitely. This model describes the setting where 
the advertiser creates new advertising campaigns in the business area dissimilar to its current one, 
and bids for both campaigns in the alternating manner. Long-term expanding markets in general 
application include firms introducing new products, in which case reputation stretching is using 
the same brand name as before. For example, Sony manufactures various home-entertainment 
products, such as TVs and DVD players, while producing laptop computers under the same name. 
As in the long-term expanding case, it continues to participate in both home-entertainment and 
computing markets; thus, its reputation in the two markets may affect each other. This section 
studies the advertiser’s decision of whether to stretch its reputation on an existing market to the 
long-term expanding market, when the effect in the case of stretching will bounce between the 
two markets throughout the infinite horizon. 
 
We model the long-term expanding case in the way that the expanding and the existing markets 
take place one after another from period to period. We assume the discounting of future revenue 
is reasonably small so that the impact of the initial reputation in the expanding market on the 
overall revenue can be ignored. For instance, in the case of non-stretching the starting reputation 
for the expanding market is , but its effect on the overall revenue is gradually replaced by that 
of the advertiser’s actual performance in the expanding market overtime. Moreover, we continue 
with the setup that the performance in the expanding markets can be 
0q
ε+2q  or ε−2q  with 
equal probability.  
 
We check the payoffs in two consecutive periods, the existing market period and the expanding 
market period. In the case of stretching, the payoff in the expanding market is , 
since here expected performance is , and the reputation is , the performance in the existing 
market, i.e.,  and  in (2). Similarly, we can formulate the payoff in the existing 
market noting the performance is  and the reputation can be 
∫ iv dttqHqK 0 1222 )(
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probabilities. Therefore, the two-period payoff is 
∫ ∫∫ +−++ i ii v vv dttqHqKdttqHqdttqHq 0 0 12222110 211 )())((21))((21 εε  
In the case of non-stretching, the two-period payoff is 
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We check the difference in payoffs between stretching and non-stretching:  
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Hence, if , it is optimal for an advertiser to stretch. 0>Δ
 
We denote , the difference in the unit 
surplus between stretching and non-stretching in the expanding market. Similar to the short-term 
expanding case, the relative market size impacts the stretching decision, but in a different 
pattern. 
),()])(())(()(2[ 2120 222212 qqDdttqHtqHtqH
iv ≡−−+−∫ εε
 
Proposition 4: Given  and 2q ε , for an advertiser with  and a big enough market ( ), 
if , it is optimal for the advertiser to stretch; if 
1q
*
2 KK ≥
0),( 212 >qqD 0),( 212 <qqD , it is optimal not to 
stretch. 
Proof: The proof is similar to that of Proposition (1). Q.E.D. 
 
Given the competition structure and the expected performance in the expanding market, 
 requires that  is sufficiently large, or the advertiser has a good reputation in the 
existing market. 
0),( 212 >qqD 1q
 
Here the similar intuition as in Proposition (1) holds: when the expanding market is large enough, 
a good-reputation advertiser stretches, and a bad-reputation advertiser does not. However, the 
differences from the short-term case are significant. First, notice that the assigned reputation  
does not play a role in the stretching decision, this is due to our assumption that the discounting 
of future revenue flow is reasonable small. In addition, the stretching decision closely relates to 
the performance (  and 
0q
2q ε ) as well as the competition ( ) in the expanding market when 
the expanding market is large. In contrast, in the short-term case, the stretching decision 
critically depends on the difference between  and . 
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Next we discuss the impact of the performance in the expanding market ( ,2q ε ) on the stretching 
decision. We focus on the case with the same competition in both markets ( ). )()( 21 sHsH =
 
Proposition 5: Given ε ,  and 2K )()( 21 sHsH = , for an advertiser with , there exist  and 
 such that under any  or  it is optimal for the advertiser not to stretch. For 
, the optimal decision on stretching depends on further conditions. 
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Proof: In the case with , )()( 21 sHsH = ),()(5.0 212122 qqDqqK −=Δ . Denote  as the solution 
to  and  as the solution to 
*
2q
0122 =− qqK **2q 0),( 212 =qqD . Let . For any 
,  since  increases in  and  decrease in . Similarly, 
, for any , 
},max{ **2
*
22 qqq
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)( 122 qqq
U> 0<Δ 122 qqK − 2q ),( 212 qqD 2q
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22 qqq
L = )( 122 qqq L< 0<Δ . In both cases, it is optimal for the advertiser not 
to stretch. Q.E.D. 
 
This proposition states that the gap between the expected performances in two markets 
determines the advertiser's stretching decision. When the difference between the two markets is 
large, the advertiser gets a high total payoff keeping the reputations separate mainly from the 
market with the high expected performance. However, if the advertiser chooses to stretch, the 
reputations of the two markets are merged. Since the auctions in two markets take place one after 
another, the payoff from the market with the high reputation will be greatly compromised, while 
the payoff from the other low-reputation market will not be pulled up high enough to compensate. 
As a result, it is optimal not to stretch when the difference between the expected performances 
from the two markets is large enough. As a result, when  is sufficiently big, it is optimal not 
to stretch. 
2q
 
When  is small enough, it is equivalent to viewing  is relatively big enough. Due to the 
symmetry in the long-term expanding (we can see the problem as stretching from expanding 
market to the existing market), the similar analysis shows that it is optimal not to stretch. 
2q 1q
 
Notice that this result is significantly different from that in the short-term case, where stretching 
is optimal for good-reputation advertisers as long as the expanding market looks optimistic 
enough. Such difference is mainly driven by the asymmetry in the way reputations in two 
markets impact payoffs. In particular, in the short-term case, the advertiser does not have a 
chance to build up its reputation in the expanding market:  has no way to impacts the 
reputation in the expanding market. In contrast, in the long-term case,  can be shifted to affect 
the reputation in the existing market if stretched or the expanding market if not stretched, just 
like the role of . 
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Similar to the short-term case, the risk of the performance in the expanding market also impacts 
the stretching decision. 
 
Proposition 6: In the case with the same competition in both markets ( ) and 
convex , if , the gain from stretching is increasing in the risk of the performance 
of the expanding market; if , the opposite holds. 
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Proof: Notice that . In the case with 
convex ,  by the definition of convexity. So, if , 
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0)(' >Δ ε  and thus  increases in Δ ε . If 221 qKq < , Δ  decreases in ε . Q.E.D. 
 
The positive effect from risk is different in the long-term expanding case. Here the risk can 
impact either the existing market or the expanding market. If the advertiser stretches, the positive 
effect hits the existing market; in the non-stretching case, the positive effect only impacts the 
expanding market. Therefore, when the existing market is larger, it is optimal for the advertiser 
to utilize the effect on the existing market, and stretch; otherwise, not stretching is the optimal 
choice. 
 
According to the findings in this section, advertisers considering bidding with a second 
advertising campaign long term should implement their stretching strategies differently than in 
the temporary expanding market case. The assigned default reputation value here is negligible. 
Only the size, the performance, and the competitiveness of the expanding market impact the 
stretching decision. Moreover, the existing market and the expanding market will operate in a 
symmetric fashion; thus the difference between the performances in the two markets matters.  
 
6. Conclusion 
Motivated by keyword auctions, we analyzed advertisers’ reputation stretching decisions in 
short-term and long-term models. We found that the stretching decision is critically dependent on 
the market size, the expected performance of the expanding market, and the risk of performance 
in the expanding market. Moreover, some of the results of the conditions for stretching are 
significantly different in the short-term and the long-term settings.  
 
In the two-period short-term model, if stretching means using a better reputation, the advertiser is 
willing to stretch if the expanding market is sufficiently big. And intuitively, a promising 
expanding market induces a high-reputation advertiser to stretch. In the long-term case, although 
a large expanding market size also lead to stretching, the difference between the performances of 
the two markets determines the advertiser’s stretching behavior, since the effect of stretching is 
symmetric for the two markets in the infinite horizon. We also found that in both cases, higher 
risk yields a higher payoff for the following period, thus is desirable for the advertisers. In the 
short-term case, a higher risk provides the advertiser with more incentive to stretch; but in the 
long-term case, the advertiser bases its decision on the comparison of the effects of risk on the 
two markets, because depending on its stretching decision, the positive risk effect can carry onto 
either market. 
 
The results derived from our model provide significant insights for the reputation stretching issue. 
Our analysis on the risk effect and other factors in both the short-term and long-term cases 
provided in-depth understanding to reputation stretching decision in the competitive environment. 
By finding conditions for optimal stretching decision, our study has taken a preliminary step to 
designing an optimal reputation system. Some work that follows may include auctioneer’s 
strategies in designing a reputation system given the equilibrium behaviors of the bidders, and 
further developments of the model to consider multiple advertisers with such decision problem 
or conditional performance in the markets based on the past reputation. 
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